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RONDEAU V. MOSINEE PAPER
COMPANY AND THE WILLIAMS ACT
INJUNCTION
RICHARD H. PORTER* AND KATHLEEN HYLAND**
The Williams Act' was enacted to provide certain specified
information to management and shareholders in advance of a
tender offer or proxy contest. The legislative history of the Act 2
traces the background and need for such legislation.
It was urged during the hearings that takeover bids should
not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in
providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management.
It was also recognized that these bids are made for many
other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve
the management of the company. The bill avoids tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in
favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
3
The legislative history also outlined whose interests the Wil-
* A.B. 1969, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1972, Yale University; associate in the law
firm of Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
* * 1973, Purdue University; candidate for J.D. degree at Marquette University
Law School; member of the MARqugrra LAW REvIEw. The authors acknowledge with
appreciation the assistance of William J. Abraham.
1. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§
78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and n(d)-(f) (1970).
2. H. R. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News pp. 2811-23 (1968).
3. Id. at 2813. Senator Williams stated the purpose of his bill as being:
to require the disclosure of pertinent information ... when a person or group
of persons seek to acquire a substantial block of equity securities of a corporation
by a cash tender offer or through the open market or privately negotiated pur-
chases ....
113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967). In the Senate hearings on the Williams Act, Senator
Kuchel stated:
The stockholders have a right to know who they are dealing with, what commit-
ments have been made, and the intention and plans of the offeror. Our securities
market must be founded not on those whom [Thomas] Jefferson termed "gam-
bling scoundrels" who operate in "great mystery" but on those shareholders who
make informed decisions based on disclosure of pertinent facts.
In re The Susquehanna Corp., SEC File No. 3-1868, August 5, 1969; CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 77,741, at 83,697 (1970).
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liams Act was designed to protect: the public, the shareholder,
the target management and the tender offeror4
One of the most frequently litigated sections of the Wil-
liams Act is section 13(d).5 Under section 13(d) persons acquir-
ing ownership of more than five percent of a class of equity
security registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act must within ten days file with the SEC a 13d
schedule containing certain prescribed information. A copy of
the schedule must be sent to the issuer and each exchange
where the security is traded. A 13d schedule requires compre-
hensive disclosure about the persons purchasing the securities.
Disclosure must be made about their identities, backgrounds,
financing, purposes, holdings and recent transactions in the
security. The disclosed information is such "as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed be-
fore buying or selling the security. ... 6
Section 13(d) does not by its terms provide penalties for its
violation or mandate any civil remedy. The federal courts have,
therefore, been free to fashion remedies appropriate in each
particular case. As in other areas of the law, the resulting reme-
dies have been preliminary and permanent in nature, with
heavy reliance placed on use of the injunction. In attempting
to mold the injunction to accommodate the often competing
Williams Act interests-those of the public, shareholder, man-
agement and offeror-the courts have designed several varia-
tions to the injunction, both in the standard used to determine
whether to award the remedy and in designing the remedy
itself. Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered,
for the first time, the validity of some of these variations in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co. 7
4. They are listed in their general order of priority. For an examination of the
interests of the offeror, management and shareholder, see Note, Judicial Control of
Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114 (1974).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). Also subject to frequent litigation is the general
antifraud provision of the Williams Act, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. 78n(e) (1970) which pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made
not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request or invitation.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1976).
7. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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This article will review the Williams Act injunction and its
variations in preliminary and permanent relief, especially in
view of the case law concerning section 13(d). It will examine
the effectiveness of the injunction in light of the purpose of the
Act and the interests it protects. Finally, the article will discuss
the Rondeau decision and its effect on Williams Act remedies
in general, and the injunction in particular.
I. PRELIMINARY RELIEF
Usually the relief awarded in Williams Act cases comes in
the preliminary stages of the action, before the consummation
of a takeover bid rather than afterwards. Federal courts have
consistently recognized that at this stage the "opportunity for
doing equity is . . . considerably better . . . than it will be
later on," 8 and the courts enjoy great flexibility due to the still
fluid nature of the controversy.
Five basic forms of preliminary relief have been suggested
by the courts. They are:
(1) temporary restraining order pending a hearing on pre-
liminary relief;9
(2) preliminary enjoining of the takeover bid with an op-
portunity to renew the offer after trial if the offeror is vindi-
cated on the merits;'0
(3) preliminary enjoining of the takeover bid with an op-
portunity to renew the offer before trial upon the court's ap-
proval of supplemental disclosures;"
(4) permitting the tender offer to proceed upon the filing
and distribution of a proper schedule accompanied by an op-
portunity for shareholders who have already tendered their
shares to withdraw;' 2 and
8. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969).
9. Texasgulf Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
10. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 476
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Ozark
Air Lines Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Committee for New Manage-
ment of Butler Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. N.Y. 1971); General Host
Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Water & Wall
Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Industries, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,943
(1973).
11. Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D. N.J.), aff d,
497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1975); Sonesta International
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. Butler Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d
842 (2d Cir. 1970).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(5) rescission and injunction against further solicitation
for a certain period or in the alternative allowing the offer to
raise the price for both past and future tenders.'3
Which form of preliminary relief is selected in a particular
case will depend on the nature of the violation and the particu-
lar facts of the case. A mere failure to file, for example, is
usually deemed a less serious offense than a fraudulent disclo-
sure. Similarly, a suit alleging a Williams Act violation alone
may require less drastic relief than one alleging additional vio-
lations of the antitrust or licensing laws. Other factors such as
the relative significance of the nondisclosure to the tendering
shareholder, the availability of the information from other
sources, similar nondisclosures by the movant, the amount of
time remaining in the offer, and the necessity of an extended
discovery and a lengthy trial on the merits may also influence
the court's selection of a remedy.
A. Temporary Restraining Order
When instituted for only a short period the temporary re-
straining order results in little delay to the tender offer. 4 How-
ever, in Texasgulf Inc. v. Canada Development Corp. 15 the tem-
porary restraining order was extended for a two-month period,
with obvious adverse effects on the tender offer. The effect of
the temporary restraining order was to "stop the clock" in order
to give Texasgulf's board time to organize a defense to the
tender offer, which was management's clear purpose in bring-
ing the action. Although all claims of violation were ultimately
rejected by the court, the delay" bought enough time for Texas-
gulf to announce a $46,000,000 expansion program, 7 a new ore
13. Neither alternative has ever been invoked in a Williams Act case but it would
be appropriate where the offeror's failure to disclose has improperly held down the
price of the stock, and where without rescission the offeror stands within striking
distance of his takeover goal. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1969).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
15. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
16. Texasgulf obtained a temporary restraining order on July 27, a ten day exten-
sion on September 4 to allow Canada Development Corp. ten days to amend its offer
"out of an abundance of caution" and for Texasgulf to apply for an appeal, and a
further extension on September 14 pending Texasgulf's appeal on October 10. The
restraining order was dissolved on October 10.
17. N.Y. Times, September 13, 1973, at 73, col. 2.
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strike's and high earnings'9 which drove the price of Texasgulf
stock above the offer price." This delay was won even though
the court stressed that the tender offeror had repeatedly volun-
teered to amend its schedules in good faith.2 ' In addition, the
court found that over two months of litigation had inflicted
hardship on the tendering shareholders who could not negotiate
their shares or receive money due to them from the offeror
because of the temporary restraining order.Y
B. Preliminary Injunction
In Williams Act cases, preliminary injunctions have been
granted upon a showing of either (1) probable success upon the
merits and irreparable harm, or (2) serious questions on the
merits requiring litigation, when coupled with a balance of the
hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting pre-
liminary relief. 3 These rules differ in two major respects. First,
the emphasis in the former standard is on finding irreparable
harm to the movant, while the latter standard involves a pro-
cess of balancing the equities between shareholders, manage-
ment, the offeror, and the public in light of the purpose of the
Act and the practical effect of the particular remedy. Secondly,
the latter rule has been invoked where a clear, pervasive and
vital public interest is involved so that the movant is in effect
acting as a "private attorney general" when protecting his own
private interests.24 Under the latter standard all doubts are
resolved in favor of granting the injunction:
18. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1973, at 38, col. 3.
19. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1973, at 33, col. 5.
20. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1973, at 54, col. 1.
21. The court also noted over two months of litigation had bought Texasgulf more
time than it needed to counter the tender offer and that the lengthy hearing and
extensive news coverage had informed the shareholders on the matters that should be
disclosed as well as any shareholders had ever been informed in a tender offer. 366 F.
Supp. at 430.
22. Allowing the tender offer to proceed would also work to the benefit of the
nontendering shareholders because:
When the tender offer is consummated, one-third of Texasgulf's shares will be
removed from the active market. This probably will have a bullish effect on the
market for the remaining shares since Texasgulf is a highly traded stock.
366 F. Supp. at 430.
23. Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250
(2d Cir. 1973); Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 476 F.2d 687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.,
476 F.2d 687, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Since it is impossible as a practical matter for the govern-
ment to seek out and prosecute every important violation of
laws designed to protect the public in the aggregate, private
actions brought by members of the public i n their capacities
as investors or competitors, which incidentally benefit the
general public interest, perform a vital public service. As the
Supreme Court said in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964), private actions provide "a necessary supplement"
to actions by the government and the possibility of civil dam-
ages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in
the enforcement of laws designed to protect the public inter-
est.'
1. The "Irreparable Harm" Standard
The traditional basis of injunctive relief in federal courts
has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal rem-
edies.2 The standard of irreparable harm was first considered
in a Williams Act case in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot.27 In this
case, Blot was a shareholder of Bath Industries who conspired
with others to replace the chief executive officer. At the same
time, Bath was engaged in competition with another firm for a
contract involving the construction of one hundred destroyers
over ten years for the United States Navy. The contract would
involve billions of dollars and would require Bath to acquire a
substantial amount of new capital, construct a new shipyard,
and more than double the number of its employees. In Septem-
ber of 1969, Blot hired a team of proxy fight specialists and
called for a special shareholders meeting for the purpose of
forcing the chief executive officer's resignation. This meeting
was to be held one day before the date scheduled for the award
of the Navy contract. The district court 8 found that Blot's
group threatened to cause permanent and irreparable harm to
the company because a strongly contested proxy fight probably
would greatly diminish Bath's chances of obtaining the Navy
contract. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was granted
enjoining the Blot group from proceeding with their plan or
their special meeting until the court determined that they had
complied with section 13(d) of the Williams Act.29 With respect
25. Id.
26. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959).
27. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
28. 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
29. The order enjoined defendants and persons controlled by them or in active
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to Blot's contention on appeal that no irreparable harm was
shown to result from his failure to file a 13d schedule because
there was no reason to believe the Navy would not award the
contract to Bath even with new management, the court noted
it was very likely that the Navy would be reluctant to deal with
any Bath management during or after a divisive proxy fight.
And to Blot's further contention that this harm was not caused
by his failure to file because a 13d schedule would have re-
vealed the rift in Bath management, the court replied that the
adverse effects of a timely disclosure on Bath's position in the
contract competition would have been significantly less than
the adverse effects of a disclosure coming after the action was
filed and after the defendants had already acquired sufficient
Bath stock to insure a change in Bath management.3 1 Nor did
the court accept the argument that Blot's late filing of a 13d
schedule was sufficient compliance.
If [Blot was] in fact required to file statements pursuant to
the Williams Act sometime near mid-summer of 1969, the
filing of 13d schedules in October, 1969 may well be insuffi-
cient to cure the failure to file earlier. The purpose of the
filing and notification provisions is to give investors and
stockholders the opportunity to assess the insurgents' plans
before selling or buying stock in the corporation. It addition-
ally gives them the opportunity to hear from incumbent man-
agement on the merit or lack of merit of the insurgents'
proposals. If [Blot's] late filing is sufficient, then no insur-
gent group will ever file until news of their existence and plan
leaks out and prompts a law suit. By that time it will be too
late to avoid the evils which the Williams Act is designed to
eliminate. 2
The court of appeals, in affirming the award of a preliminary
injunction against Blot, also enjoined the annual meeting of
the company until it was finally determined whether the Blot
group should be disenfranchised.3
concert with them "from proceeding with their plan (including but not limited to
removing the chief executive officer of Bath and calling for a special shareholders'
meeting) until [it is determined that] they have complied with section 13(d) of the
1934 Act." 427 F.2d at 101.
30. 427 F.2d at 112.
31. Id. at 113.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 113-14, n. 8.
It should be pointed out that as this litigation continued to consume time after
1976]
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The meaning of "irreparable harm" also became an issue in
Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox.34 That case involved a plan to take
control of financially troubled Ozark Air Lines by soliciting
proxies for the election of directors at the next annual meeting
of shareholders. Cox Medical Center, a party to the takeover
plan, controlled more than ten percent of Ozark's common
stock. Management claimed that Cox Medical Center had vio-
lated section 13(d) and sought by preliminary injunction to
prevent the solicitation of proxies and the voting of Cox shares
for candidates for director other than those nominated by man-
agement. Ozark claimed irreparable harm in that its lenders
would not continue to waive payment defaults if a proxy fight
caused a change in management, and in that the expense of
waging a proxy battle would further worsen the company's fi-
nancial position. The court rejected Ozark's claims because it
found the lenders might welcome a constructive change in
management. The court would not equate the importance of
default waivers with the importance of the Navy contract for
Bath Industries. "An injunction at this time affecting the right
of the shareholders to pass upon the performance of their man-
agement and determine for themselves who will lead the corpo-
ration out of its present difficulties seems particularly inappro-
priate."'3 , The court also noted that the expense of a proxy
contest would have been no less if the defendant had filed a 13d
schedule earlier.3 6
Whether irreparable harm resulted from a conceded viola-
tion of the Williams Act was at issue in Committee for New
Management of Butler Aviation v. Widmark.Y1 Plaintiff Dopp,
a large shareholder and former director of Butler organized a
committee to regain control of the corporation by proxy solici-
the court below acted, the time for the annual meeting of the Bath stockholders
approached. Since the preliminary injunction effectively disenfranchises defen-
dants from voting at stockholders' meetings, we have enjoined, on motion of
defendant appellants, the holding of that meeting until further order of this
court. Thus, the status quo will continue to be preserved until it is finally
determined whether defendants should be disenfranchised from voting all or any
part of the stock which they hold, some of which they held prior to the alleged
violation.
34. 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
35. Id. at 1119.
36. The court further noted that they were dealing with a regularly scheduled
meeting of shareholders at which directors were regularly elected, and not a "special
meeting presumably called at a propitious tactical moment" as in Bath. Id. at 1119.
37. 335 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
[Vol. 59
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tation for the next annual meeting of shareholders. Dopp sued
on a claim that management had issued misleading solicita-
tions. Management moved for a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that Dopp had failed to comply with the filing require-
ments of section 13(d). Dopp conceded the violation but
claimed that Butler could establish no irreparable harm be-
cause it had been aware of his stock acquisitions. 8 Manage-
ment argued that a proper 13d schedule would have given more
information about the sources of funds used to make Dopp's
purchases, and that the absence of such information consti-
tuted irreparable harm. The court emphasized that this was
not a case of misunderstanding about the application of section
13(d) but an intentional statutory violation that had caused
confusion which could have been avoided had early disclosure
been made.39 "If Section 13(d) means anything, plaintiff Dopp
should not be permitted to gain advantage from a course of
action pursued in clear violation of the law."4 Accordingly, the
court enjoined Dopp from voting those shares which he had
acquired after the 13d schedule should have been filed. The
injunction extended only to the upcoming annual meeting.
2. The "Balancing-the-Equities" Standard
The balancing standard evolved out of and away from the
irreparable harm standard. The balancing standard first ap-
peared in Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great A & P Tea
Co., Inc.4" In that case the Second Circuit purportedly applied
the "balancing of the hardships" standard in upholding the
award of a preliminary injunction.42 Gulf & Western issued a
38. Dopp claimed that Butler learned of his stock acquisitions while he had been
part of its management and from various sources, such as his 14b filing, after his
resignation. 335 F. Supp. at 154.
39. Butler also claimed that filing would have prevented Dopp from concealing his
purchases through the use of nominees so that his ownership would not appear on
Butler's stock transfer records. 335 F. Supp. at 155.
40. Id. at 155.
41. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. The court actually applied neither standard. Intead it combined a probability
of success on the merits with a balance of the equities.
[Iln government antitrust actions involving alleged Clayton Act violations, a
"balancing of the equities-in terms of injury to the public interest if an injunc-
tion were denied, as against injury to the defendants if it were granted-is a
relevant factor, once the probability of success standard has been met, in decid-
ing whether to deny or grant injunctive relief."
Id. at 693, citing United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 766, 797 n. 95 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1972).
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tender offer to A & P shareholders without disclosing that it
controlled several suppliers and a major competitor of A & P.
These facts would have alerted A & P shareholders to the possi-
bility that control of A & P by Gulf & Western could violate
the antitrust laws. The district court found a strong likelihood
that Gulf & Western had failed to make adequate disclosures
under the Williams Act. The court then weighed the equities
between A & P, A & P shareholders, the public and Gulf &
Western. The court determined that consummation of the
tender offer could involve A & P in an antitrust suit at a later
date when "it would be almost impossible to unravel the situa-
tion. 4 3 The court also found that the magnitude and far-
reaching consequences of the alleged violations of antitrust and
securities laws involved such a "clear, pervasive, and vital pub-
lic interest"" as to warrant an injunction. Gulf & Western's
interest in investing did not impress the court in view of the
antitrust problems and their effect on the public interest, espe-
cially since Gulf & Western was not foreclosed from renewing
its tender offer if it was vindicated on the merits.
Much of the reasoning in that case was adopted in General
Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc. " In balancing the equi-
ties the court in general found that the disadvantage to man-
agement resulting from the offeror's failure to comply with
section 14(e) outweighed the harm suffered by the offeror who
was unable to consummate its tender offer at such time as it
deemed profitable. In view of the fact that the offeror brought
on its troubles by failing to comply with the Williams Act, the
court held: "[The offeror] has no inherent right to so proceed
with an unlawful tender offer. 47 Consummation of the tender
offer was thereupon enjoined pending trial on the merits. The
court considered but rejected corrective relief of rescission and
supplemental disclosures. It reasoned that while this remedy
might avoid frustrating the desires of those who wished to
tender when all the facts were known, it would not protect the
43. 476 F.2d at 698.
44. Id. at 699.
45. 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
46. Host alleged that Triumph's tender offer violated: (1) the federal shipping and
communications laws, (2) the margin requirements of securities law, and (3) the disclo-
sure requirements of securities law. Id.
47. Id. at 759.
48. Id.
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public interest because the situation would be almost impossi-
ble to unravel if management's allegations were sustained at
trial after the tender offer was consummated.49 Accordingly,
the tender offer was enjoined.
In Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer
Industries," Water & Wall solicited proxies in connection with
American Consumer Industries' annual shareholders meeting.
Management claimed, inter alia, that Water & Wall had failed
to file a timely 13d schedule. After determining that the allega-
tions could ultimately succeed, the court stated:
When presented with the situation such as the present
one, courts have often been hard put to place their finger
on a specific irreparable injury flowing from the viola-
tion[s]. . . .This is probably due to the fact that what the
court seeks to enjoin is future injury. The more intelligent
approach ... is to examine the interests involved ... with
an eye toward not allowing the violator to eat his apples with
"unclean hands."5
Using this method, the court found possible irreparable harm
in that a complete change in management would be difficult
to undo, and in that shareholders were denied information
about the intentions of the takeover group. 52 Because manage-
ment had assumed the dual role of protecting its own interests
and enforcing the securities laws, the court also found that a
pervasive public interest was served by management.53 How-
ever, the court noted it would attempt to mold a remedy which
properly recognized the interests of the offeror. Thereupon the
court enjoined the voting of shares owned by the offeror but
allowed other votes to be counted. The outcome of the election
was to be certified if management candidates were successful,
but if the offeror's candidates were chosen, the election could
not be certified without application to the court. 4
49. Id.
50. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,943 (1973).
51. Id. at 93,759.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 93,760.
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C. Variations to the Preliminary Injunction
The courts and legal commentators55 have suggested varia-
tions to a preliminary injunction which are less drastic than
enjoining the tender offer until after trial. One suggestion has
been a preliminary injunction with an opportunity to renew the
tender offer before trial upon filing of curative amendments to
the documents, for example, a 13d schedule or the offering
circular. 6 This remedy enjoys the advantage of allowing the
tendering shareholders the ultimate decision regarding the use
of their shares. Moreover, this remedy causes little delay to the
tender offer. The courts have elected this remedy in two cases.
In Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft,57 Liquifin
was enjoined "during the pendency of the action and until the
trial on the merits""8 from soliciting tenders, acquiring stock or
voting previously acquired stock of Ronson. The court recog-
nized that an offeror may amend its schedules to cure defects,
may rely on the amendments to satisfy the statute, and may
be entitled to dissolution of a preliminary injunction against
the offer after curative amendments. 9 Nonetheless, two mo-
tions to vacate Ronson's injunction, after amendment and re-
statement of the tender offer, were denied before trial so that
the preliminary injunction was ultimately lifted only after trial
on the merits.6"
55. One commentator advocates permitting the tender offer to be consummated;
however, requiring curative amendments and an opportunity for tendering sharehold-
ers to withdraw if a violation is found within a certain period after the consummation
of the tender offer. Young, Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments: The
Need to Separate the Questions of Violation and Relief, 27 Bus. LAWYER 391 (1971).
Another commentator favors limiting the preliminary injunction to enjoining the con-
summation of the tender offer but not the solicitation and collection of shares and
ordering the already tendered shares into escrow. Note, Judicial Control of Cash
Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114, 139 (1974). Yet
another commentator offered a completely different alternative which would require
the tender offeror to submit a pre-offer filing to the SEC for clearance and the SEC to
examine the offer for substantive nondisclosures. Note, The Courts and the Williams
Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1017 (1973). Pre-offer filing was
proposed in the original bill for the Williams Act and rejected because it would provide
advance warning of the offer to the target.
56. This remedy is endorsed in Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little
Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1016 (1973).
57. 370 F. Supp. 597 (D. N.J.), afl'd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 870 (1974).
58. 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973) and 483 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. 370 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D. N.J. 1974).
60. Id. at 600.
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A similar approach was adopted in Sonesta International
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates." Wellington's tender
offer for 1,000,000 shares of Sonesta stock expired with only
419,623 shares being tendered. The appellate court found .So-
nesta entitled to a preliminary injunction by virtue of Welling-
ton's failure to make material disclosures. Although these dis-
closures were deemed "material" to the shareholders, the court
recognized that the failure of Wellington's takeover bid had
eliminated any possibility of harm. 2 The court nonetheless
entered a preliminary injunction enjoining consummation of
the offer unless and until Wellington made supplemental dis-
closures and offered tendering shareholders an opportunity to
rescind their tenders within a reasonable time.
Another suggested variation of the preliminary injunction is
to permit the tender offer to proceed upon the filing and distri-
bution of a proper schedule, accompanied by an opportunity
for the shareholders who have already tendered their shares to
withdraw. 3 Under this remedy, the tender offer is not inter-
rupted. This remedy is applicable only when there remains
enough time in the tender offer to accommodate the distribu-
tion of curative amendments and the allowance of a reasonable
time to withdraw. In Butler Aviation International, Inc. v.
Comprehensive Designers, Inc.,64 only the lack of sufficient
time caused the appellate court to affirm the award of a prelim-
inary injunction instead of allowing curative amendments.
This was an action for violations of sections 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. The district
court 5 issued a preliminary injunction twenty days before the
expiration of the offer. The injunction forbade the offeror to
take any steps to effect its offer. On appeal, the Second Circuit
found the offeror had misrepresented its earnings to the press
61. 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. For example, one alleged nondisclosure was Wellington's decision to abstain
from voting on two proposals scheduled for Sonesta's annual shareholders meeting
which probably would have prevented the required two-thirds vote for approval from
being attained. However, the annual meeting for which the voting on Sonesta's propos-
als was scheduled had already taken place and the proposals had been approved by
the time of the court's decision.
63. In Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical
Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114, 130 (1974), a similar remedy was suggested-a
conditional injunction, enjoining the tender offer after a specified period of time, such
as ten days, unless the offer satisfactorily cures the nondisclosures.
64. 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
65. 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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while the tender offer was under consideration, but the damage
caused thereby was minimal, the effect of the misstatements
had been largely dissipated, and in any event they were already
corrected. 6 Moreover, Butler's management had unclean
hands in that it also made misleading earnings predictions.
The appellate court, reluctant to frustrate informed sharehold-
ers who desired to tender their stock, preferred to allow cura-
tive amendments. But the court recognized that the time re-
maining was insufficient for curative amendments to be dis-
tributed since the appeal had taken most of the time outstand-
ing in the offer. Forced to affirm or reverse, the court affirmed
the grant of the preliminary injunction.67 However, the offeror
was explicitly allowed to renew its tender offer after full disclo-
sure.
68
D. The Effectiveness of Preliminary Relief
Preliminary relief has been granted whenever the Williams
Act violation threatened to cause a change in management
without adequate prior notice to the shareholders and the pub-
lic that such a change was planned. Without such advance
notice the price of shares of the target company may not reflect
the premium which takeover bids generally cause, especially
when widely advertised. Moreover, knowledge of the impend-
ing proxy struggles could cause some investors either to sell
their shares or not to buy any because of the uncertainty and
instability which frequently results. Preliminary relief has
proven useful in preventing takeover by surprise. However, it
is no substitute for timely notice to the marketplace. Case law
shows that the courts do not place a high value on the damage
done to an offeror whose plans are upset because of its own
failure to comply with the Williams Act. Courts have already
ruled that the offeror's interest in not losing an investment
66. The court also noted that some of the shares were tendered by sophisticated
investors who tendered with full knowledge of Butler's claims. 425 F.2d at 845.
67. Id.
68. In Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,342 (1976), the court acknolwedged that an extension of the tender offer would allow
for corrective disclosures but chose, nevertheless, to award a preliminary injunction
instead of granting an opportunity for consummation. The court reasoned that the
offeror had already "modified" the terms of its tender offer three times and with a
further supplemental disclosure, the shareholder would be required to read four notices
to understand the contents of the offer. Consequently, it felt that only an entirely new
offering statement could cure the problems inherent in the tender offer.
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opportunity at such time as it deems ripe and profitable will
not save an otherwise unlawful tender offer.69 Case law also
shows that no formula has yet been devised to consider or to
compensate the investing public which has been deprived of its
Williams Act notice. Because the Act adopts a neutral stance
toward takeover bids, its purpose would seem to be served, in
theory, by a preliminary injunction which is intended to main-
tain the status quo during the pendency of the action. But it
is unlikely that a preliminary injunction which simply halts the
progress of the tender offeror will maintain the status quo be-
cause a viable tender offer depends on the existence of several
factors which cannot be controlled by injunction. For example,
a privately financed offeror may be unable to keep its money
tied up during the injunctive period. Also the price of the stock
may rise above the price offered by the tender offeror, or the
target management may implement defensive tactics which
dissuade stockholders from tendering. Consequently, the
practical effect of the preliminary injunction may often be to
destroy the tender offer. This problem was recognized as early
as 1969 when the court in Electronics Specialty Corp. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp.70 warned that target companies often
69. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.,
476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 749 (S.D. N.Y. 1973). In Otis Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del.
1973), the court, considering alleged antitrust violations, granted a preliminary injunc-
tion over the interests of the offeror and shareholder who wished to tender:
As far as Microdot is concerned, the issuance of a preliminary injunction will
mean that it will lose an opportunity to acquire a controlling interest in Elco.
The loss may or may not be temporary. The same conditions may not exist
again. If so, Microdot will be irreparably injured. I conclude, however, that
where the probability of unlawfulness and of injury to others is as strong as it is
here, the acquiring corporation's interest in the consummation of the transac-
tion must be subordinated. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company, supra; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated
Indus. Inc., supra.
Similar considerations apply with respect to those Elco shareholders who
have tendered their shares in response to the offer. Microdot stresses that a
preliminary injunction barring consummation of the tender offer will deprive
these stockholders of their premium. If Microdot's acquisition is in violation of
the Clayton Act, this is a premium to which they cannot justly lay claim. If
Microdot is vindicated and conditions permit the resuscitation of the offer, the
loss will be a temporary one. If conditions do not permit renewal of the offer at
the termination of this litigation, the tendering stockholders may indeed suffer
some irremedial loss. On this record, however, I conclude that this limited
interest of Elco's tendering stockholders must yield. [Footnote omitted].
360 F. Supp. at 754-55.
70. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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"resort to the courts on trumped up or trivial grounds as a
means for delaying and thereby defeating legitimate tender
offers,"" and that preliminary relief should not be granted
lightly. The wisdom in that warning was demonstrated only too
well in Texasgulf, where the court allowed itself to become a
tool for management. If the Williams Act is to fulfill its purpose
of protecting shareholders without favoring either management
or offeror, the courts must mete out preliminary relief so as to
prevent unnecessary delays by the target management. 2 This
applies to the court's determination of whether to award pre-
liminary relief and to the court's selection of the form of relief.
Prior to 1975 7 the cases evidenced a significant trend away
from the requirement of irreparable harm used in Bath and
toward the balancing-the-equities formula used in Gulf &
Western to determine whether to award a preliminary injunc-
tion. Although the balancing-the-equities formula properly
provides for weighing all the interests protected under the Act,
it also tended to undermine the general rule that preliminary
injunction must not be granted lightly.
One reason for this was the elimination of the irreparable
harm standard. As originally conceived, a need for irreparable
harm was coupled with the requirement of finding a balance of
the hardships in favor of the movant. The balancing test was
used to lighten the burden of showing a probability of success
on the merits. 74 Instead, more recent cases viewed balancing
71. Id. at 947. See also Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 209-
10 (2d Cir. 1973) where the court stated:
A familiar defensive tactic increasingly used by target companies to delay
or thwart a take-over bid made by the tender offeror has been the institution of
a lawsuit against the offeror charging violation of the federal antitrust laws or
non-disclosure of material information in violation of the Williams Act ....
72. For a discussion of the need for the Williams Act rule to protect the target from
corporate raiders, see Comment, Corenco v. Schiavone: The Cash Tender Offeror as
Corporate Raider, 26 MAINE L. REV. 93 (1974).
73. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
74. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 476
F.2d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 1973):
And in Checker Motor Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969), the standard which we find particularly applicable
here was set forth as follows:
"The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo
pending a final determination of the merits. . . . It is an extraordinary
remedy, and will not be granted except upon a clear showing of probable
success and possible irreparable injury (emphasis that of the Court). ...
However, 'the burden [of showing probable success] is less where the
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the equities as an alternative to finding irreparable harm.75 The
closest these cases came to finding irreparable harm was to
foresee that a denial of preliminary relief might create a situa-
tion almost impossible to unravel if the tender offer were con-
summated and a takeover occurred.76 This standard appears
less stringent than that of irreparable harm inasmuch as any
change of management resulting from a proxy fight may be
difficult to unravel, but such a change should not be automati-
cally deemed to cause irreparable harm. 77 The better test would
require the movant to show that he and/or the shareholder will
suffer irreparable harm absent the relief sought, that it is likely
he will prevail at a final hearing upon the merits, and that the
balance of the equities between the offeror, the tendering and
nontendering shareholders, the target company, and the public
favors granting the relief requested. 71
The requirement of irreparable harm was also undermined
by the broadened meaning given to "clear, pervasive, and vital
public interest," which when found compelled all doubts to be
resolved in favor of injunctive relief. In Gulf & Western, the
first case to raise the public interest standard, the possibility
of antitrust violations in the supermarket industry was suffi-
cient grounds, without more, to compel the granting of a pre-
liminary injunction .7 It is important to note that the court
could very easily have cast its decision in terms of irreparable
harm. A & P was arguably faced with irreparable harm if Gulf
balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the party requesting the tem-
porary relief.' Dino De Laurentiis Cinematografica, S. p. A. v. D-150,
Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1966). In such a case, the moving party
may obtain a preliminary injunction if he has raised questions going to
the merits so serious, substantial and difficult as to make them a fair
ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation. Unicon
Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 366 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1966); Dino
De Laurentiis Cinematografica, S. p. A. v. D-150, Inc., supra; Hamilton
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953)." (em-
phasis added) (some citations omitted). 405 F.2d at 323.
75. Id.; Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247
(2d Cir. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973); Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,
CCH FED. Sec. L. REP. 1 93,943 (1973).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,943, at 93,753 (1973).
79. 476 F.2d at 698-99; See also Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D.
Del. 1973).
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& Western gained control in violation of the antitrust laws. The
facts of that case were sufficiently compelling that failure to
use the language of irreparable harm did not amount to a sig-
nificant departure from the substance of that standard.
In subsequent cases, however, the language of the court in
Gulf & Western took on a life apart from the facts in that case.
The courts came to believe that they could enjoin proxy solici-
tations whenever they found any violation of the Williams Act
and a public interest that was served by enjoining the solicita-
tion.
In Host, the threat to the public interest supposedly lay in
the possibility that the margin requirements of the securities
law were violated by the guarantee of the offeror's loan to fi-
nance the tender offer."0 That the public interest in averting an
illegally financed takeover is as great as the public interest in
enforcement of the antitrust laws is a proposition requiring
considerable proof, but the Host court made this assumption
of equal importance without discussion.
In none of these cases was the meaning of "public interest"
clearly defined. In none of these cases did the courts indicate
why the public interest, as they chose to define it, should take
precedence over the interests of the tender offeror. Logically,
it became necessary to ground the public interest somewhere
other than the personal preferences of particular judges. There-
fore, the courts took another step. They decided that the public
interest required an injunction because of the violation of the
Act. This step was taken in Water & Wall Associates where the
need for enforcement of the security laws, i.e., the Williams
Act, was sufficient of itself to raise a clear, pervasive and vital
public interest compelling injunctive relief.
In finding a vital public interest not only in probable anti-
trust violation but also in probable Williams Act violation, the
courts took a major interpretative step. But in view of the
consequences of a preliminary injunction on the tender offer,
80. 359 F. Supp. at 759. It is interesting to note that the court, in the interest of
time, did not consider the possibility of success on the merits on the claimed violations
of the margin requirements of the securities laws, stating:
This Court, at this time, has selected for determination of probability of success
on the merits two of the issues which commend themselves for immediate con-
sideration, leaving for trial those issues which, however substantial, are not
critical to the determination of this motion.
Id. at 753.
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it would be better to require more than a potential filing error
before automatically granting a preliminary injunction. At the
very least the courts should explain the basis for their holdings
by detailing the nature of the public interest they decide to
protect and the threat they see to it.
Although lower federal courts have most frequently used
the balancing-the-equities formula as a substitute for irrepara-
ble harm, the real value of the formula may lie in the court's
selection of the form of relief once a case for relief has been
made. Its application at this stage is perhaps the most effective
means by which a court can take the tender offeror's interests
into account. For example, in Bath, the court was faced with
an imminent annual shareholders meeting at which a battle for
corporate control had been scheduled. By enjoining the share-
holders meeting, the court balanced the equities to avoid giving
management an unnecessary upper hand. In Committee for
New Management of Butler Aviation, on the other hand, the
court took a tougher stance and enjoined Dopp from voting his
illegally acquired shares without cancelling the upcoming cor-
porate election. However, the Butler Aviation case involved an
intentional violation, whereas Bath did not.
The alternatives to the preliminary injunction which allow
for curative amendments further give consideration to the of-
feror's interests by requiring only a minimal delay in the tender
offer. It is regrettable that these remedies have not been
awarded more frequently. 8' Of course, not every case warrants
minor relief. By itself curative amendment would be an inap-
propriate remedy, where, for example, irreparable harm, as in
Bath, or potential antitrust violations, as in Gulf & Western,
will not be prevented by proper disclosure. However, curative
amendments could be justified in the case of an unintentional
violation or where a "public interest," however defined, is not
involved. 2
81. Thus far, curative amendment has been suggested only where the tender offer
has already been defeated, Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Asso-
ciates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), or where substantial mitigating factors are present,
Butler Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d
Cir. 1970). Even when curative amendments are allowed, the court may not approve
them and lift the injunction. Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp.
597 (D. N.J.) aff'd 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 000 U.S. 000 (1975).
82. It should be noted that even the most lenient remedy, curative amendments
without injunction, can be awarded only after a hearing for preliminary injunction.
Consequently, curative amendments are ineffective in a situation like that presented
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II. PERMANENT REMEDIES
In Williams Act cases it is said that in fashioning a remedy,
the court's "object all sublime" should be to "let the punish-
ment fit the crime." 83 This can more easily be accomplished
when the court is apprised of the Williams Act violation before
consummation of the takeover bid. Once the tender offer has
been consummated and new management has assumed con-
trol, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to "unscramble the
eggs. 's4 At this stage any remedy imposed threatens to exceed
the culpability of the offender and to punish rather than deter.
The four forms of permanent relief sought by Williams Act
plaintiffs are:
(1) forced rescission of the sale of stock tendered to the
offeror so as to nullify consummation of the tender offer;85
(2) divestiture of shares acquired by the tender offeror in
a court supervised sale to an outside buyer; 6
(3) limitation by injunction on the voting of shares ac-
quired in violation of the security laws either permanently or
for a period of years;87 and
(4) pecuniary damages, awarded alone or in conjunction
with another permanent remedy."
The problems inherent in these remedial tools were first
discussed in Electronic Specialty Corp. v. International Con-
trols Corp.8 9 The action arose out of an attempt by Interna-
tional Controls Corp. (ICC) to acquire control of Electronics
Specialty Corp. (ELS) by cash tender offer. Management and
in Texasgulf Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
where a one month delay resulted from a temporary restraining order imposed before
the hearing on the preliminary injunction. In fact, curative amendments were the
source of further delay because the temporary restraining order was extended to allow
for their distribution even though the court had determined the offer to be lawful.
83. My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time-
To make the punishment fit the crime.
The Mikado, Act II.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir.
1969).
84. Electronic Specialty Corp. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969).
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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major shareholders commenced an action under section 14(e)
of the Williams Act, alleging that ICC had distributed mislead-
ing information about its intentions to make a tender offer.
When the district court refused to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion, the controlling interests of ELS capitulated and tendered
their holdings to ICC. Consequently, when the actions came to
trial, ICC already controlled most of the outstanding shares of
ELS, at a cost of $48,000,000. The court" awarded only an
injunction against future violations of the Williams Act. ELS
appealed denial of their claim for divestiture, an injunction
against voting, or rescission. The court of appeals9 rendered
the remedy issue moot by reversing the lower court's finding of
violation, but in dictum, rejected such "strong medicine"" as
divestiture and permanent deprivation of voting rights in a
case where two-thirds of the target's stock had been tendered.
The court estimated that divestiture of 1,200,000 shares would
involve a loss approaching $15,000,000, assuming a purchaser
could be found, and an even greater loss if the stock had to be
sold in small quantities. In the latter event, innocent nonten-
dering shareholders would be harmed as well. The court rightly
recognized that a permanent injunction against voting, or.an
injunction against the solicitation of proxies, was a disguised
method of forcing divestiture, with the added complication
that, because management had sold out, control of ELS would
be put in the hands of shareholders holding only 45 percent of
the stock. Since the price of ELS stock had sunk from the
tender offer price of thirty-five dollars to between twenty-six
and twenty-seven dollars, offering shareholders an opportunity
to withdraw was the "idlest of gestures. '93
Awards of permanent relief have been limited to those cases
in which willful and calculated violations of the Williams Act
have been clearly shown. Such was the case in Chris-Craft
Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp.4 which involved a bitter bat-
tle between Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta Corp. for control of
Piper Aircraft. After Chris-Craft lost its takeover bid, it
brought suit charging Piper Aircraft, Bangor Punta, and other
defendants with deliberate misstatements in violation of sec-
90. 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
91. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
92. Id. at 948.
93. Id. at 947.
94. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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tion 14(e) of the Williams Act, inter alia. The court found in
Chris-Craft's favor and awarded damages for the financial loss
it suffered when the appraisal value of its Piper holdings
shrank due to Chris-Craft's reduction to minority shareholder
position. The court further imposed a five-year ban which pre-
vented voting of the stock which Bangor Punta acquired during
the Williams Act violation. However, the court declined to
force divestiture of Bangor Punta's Piper shares because Piper
Aircraft had been operated by Bangor Punta management for
several years by the time the litigation was concluded. There-
fore, divestiture would be difficult to administer and would
unnecessarily reopen the control battle that Chris-Craft no
longer desired to renew in view of the changed character of the
Piper company.
In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,5 the court sug-
gested that balancing the equities would be a viable alternative
to requiring irreparable harm for an award of permanent in-
junction. In this case, defendant Fears admitted he had not
complied with section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule 14d of the SEC. The court noted that plaintiff and the
shareholders had been deprived of information material to
their investment decisions and that
in view of the public interest in insuring fair practices and
honest dealing in the acquisition of corporate shares by
tender offers, a showing by plaintiff of irreparable injury in
the usual sense is not a necessary prerequisite to an issuance
of an injunction."
Accordingly, defendant Fears was permanently enjoined from
voting all stock acquired in violation of the Williams Act.
Other courts have contemplated permanent relief without
awarding it. In Corenco v. Schiavone & Sons,9" the district
court 8 permanently restrained99 the offeror from acquiring any
shares of Corenco as a result of their tender offer "unless and
until the Schiavone defendants made full disclosure. ... 100
95. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
96. Id. at 1252.
97. 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
98. 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
99. The parties initially sought a preliminary injunction against each other but
later stipulated that the hearing on the preliminary injunction would constitute a trial
on the merits.
100. 488 F.2d at 210.
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The circuit court, '" ' one week later, modified the district court's
injunction to permit Schiavone to continue soliciting the
tender of Corenco shares upon filing an amendment to their
13d statement, distributing an amended offer to purchase
and providing tendering shareholders an opportunity to with-
draw within thirty days. '"'2 The Second Circuit suggested in
dicta, however, that even if the deficiencies in the tender offer
were corrected, permanent injunctive relief could still be ap-
propriate to insure future compliance with the Williams Act
where the offeror willfully withheld information from the target
company's shareholders. The court noted that the district court
had the equitable power to expressly limit the duration of a
permanent injunction until the defendant offerors made full
disclosures.
In H. K. Porter v. Nicholson File Co.,103 the plaintiff had
issued a tender offer to defendant's shareholders for 437,000
shares of Nicholson common stock. Only 132,292 shares were
tendered. The offeror alleged that management defeated its
tender offer by issuing false statements to its shareholders. In
overruling a motion to dismiss, the court noted that if the
offeror established a violation of the Williams Act, an award of
damages to the offeror would be justified.
In Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., ' the court refused to award
permanent relief for a "technical" violation of the Williams
Act. The violation arose when the offeror failed to file a 13d
schedule within the statutory period. Plaintiff conceded that
the offeror's assumption of control of Multi-Amp was accom-
plished with the knowledge and cooperation of the manage-
ment then in control,"'5 that the acquisition was extensively
publicized, and that the takeover had been consummated for
four and a half years before the action was brought. Neverthe-
101. Id. at 214.
102. The court stressed that the offeror had not been shown to have "guilty knowl-
edge or intent" to violate the Act because the supplemental disclosures ordered by the
district court had never before been required under the Williams Act.
103. 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp.
1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971) where the court intimated that, in spite of Ozark's failure to show
irreparable harm, it might have awarded disenfranchisement of all nonexempt shares
acquired by the group if there had been evidence of an acquisition and if there had
been no 13d filing before the commencement of the action.
104. 386 F. Supp. 44 (D. N.J. 1974).
105. Id. at 53. There was no failure to alert management of the shift in control since
it was management itself from whom the stock was purchased.
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less, plaintiff demanded that defendants be disenfranchised
from voting their shares. Noting that the violation harmed no
significant interests protected by the Act, and deprived no one
of material information, the court denied relief, stating: "A
violation of section 13(d) . . .does not automatically cause the
invocation of . . .drastic sanctions."'' 6 The court accepted
defendants' assertion that their counsel had failed to advise
them of the filing requirement and that their failure to file was
both inadvertent and unintentional. The court also found bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff in delaying the suit for four and
a half years after the acquisition.
These cases indicate that the court faces a more difficult
task in accommodating the goals of the Williams Act at this
stage of the proceeding than it did in the preliminary stages.
Violations which could have been cured by supplemental dis-
closures and an opportunity to withdraw before the tender offer
was consummated'07 can only be cured after consummation by:
(1) nullifying the effect of an unlawful tender offer by rescis-
sion, divestiture, or permanent injunction on voting;' (2) a
time limited injunction on voting; or (3) monetary damages.
The form of permanent relief awarded should be related to the
nature of the offer. The literature used by the offeror varies
greatly depending on whether the offeror is making a cash
tender offer, an exchange offer, or mere purchase of securities.
The potential damage to shareholders is greater when an ex-
change offer is made because shareholders of the target would
be asked to become shareholders of the offeror. Thus a great
deal more information is needed to make an intelligent deci-
sion. The potential damage to shareholders of the target is less
when the offeror merely purchases securities for cash from will-
ing buyers.
Similarly relief should be related to the ultimate plans of
the offeror. Divestiture, in particular, could become more or
less desirable depending on: (1) whether the offeror intends to
106. Id. at 55.
107. The case of Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1973) demonstrates that curative amendments may be prescribed in connection with
a permanent injunction when the parties agree under FED. R. Civ. P. 65 to merge their
applications for preliminary and final relief into one trial.
108. An incidental problem arises with this remedy in that the federal securities
laws place restrictions on the resale of large blocks of securities. See, e.g., § 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.
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hold the target as a subsidiary; (2) whether a merger is in-
tended in which case minority shareholders would be found
out; or (3) whether pro rata liquidation is intended, again forc-
ing out minority shareholders. Furthermore, attempting di-
vestiture years after the successful completion of the takeover
bid and after new management is installed would prove costly
and confusing, and would serve no one's interests, unless inten-
tional misconduct required punishment in the public interest.
As in Chris-Craft, the losing side of the proxy struggle may not
want a drastically changed corporation. On the other hand, no
award of relief could be inequitable to the innocent claimant
and would provide no deterrent to future violators.' The less
drastic remedy of monetary damages would be easier to admin-
ister and a satisfactory deterrent in a majority of cases. ""
Both preliminary and permanent relief cases raise two im-
portant questions. First, could irreparable harm, traditionally
the sole criterion for any kind of injunction, be supplemented
or replaced by a balancing-the-equities process when a public
interest was alleged to be involved? And secondly, how should
the courts react to supposedly "technical" violations of the
Williams Act? These questions were raised in the recent case
of Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co.'
HI. RONDEAU V. MOSINEE PAPER COMPANY
Between April and August of 1971, Francis Rondeau pur-
chased a substantial number of shares in Mosinee Paper Cor-
poration, a company engaged in the business of manufacturing,
converting and selling specialty papers, paper products and
plastics. In early July, Mosinee's stock register showed that
Rondeau controlled more than five percent of its issued and
outstanding stock; the acquisition of five percent had occurred
109. At least one commentator feels that not every Williams Act violation warrants
relief. Young, Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments: The Need to Sepa-
rate the Questions of Violation and Relief, 27 Bus. LAWYER 391 (1971).
110. The court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 60 (1975) noted:
In any event, those persons who allegedly sold at an unfairly depressed price
have an adequate remedy by way of an action for damages, thus negating the
basis for equitable relief.
The court was advised by respondent that such a suit is now pending in the
District Court and class action certification has been sought. Although we inti-
mate no views regarding the merits of that case, it provides a potential sanction
for petitioner's violation of the Williams Act.
111. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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earlier, in May, 1971. At the end of July, Mosinee's manage-
ment wrote to Rondeau to advise him that he might be violat-
ing the federal securities laws. Upon learning of the five percent
filing requirement, Rondeau placed no further orders for Mosi-
nee stock, and he retained counsel to prepare a 13d schedule,
which was filed at the end of August. Thereafter Mosinee's
management brought an action seeking to prevent Rondeau
from buying more Mosinee stock, voting the shares he already
had, or seeking to gain control of the corporation; the com-
plaint also sought damages and divestiture. After extensive
discovery, Rondeau moved for summary judgment. The dis-
trict court granted that motion because it found no danger of
irreparable harm to Mosinee, and because it found Rondeau's
violation of section 13(d) to be the result of unintentional over-
sight, rather than intentional covert and conspiratorial con-
duct. On appeal the Seventh Circuit, in a two to one decision,
reversed the district court. The grounds for reversal were (1)
that irreparable harm was not necessary for injunctive relief
under the Williams Act and (2) that violation of the Act in and
of itself mandated injunctive relief against the violator regard-
less of the reasons for the violation. The circuit court remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to enter a decree
enjoining Rondeau from further violations of section 13(d) and
from voting the shares of Mosinee stock acquired between the
due date of the 13d schedule and the date of its actual filing.
The injunction against voting extended to any takeover, proxy
contest, or election of officers or directors for a period of five
years. The decision of the Seventh Circuit followed the line of
cases in which injunctive relief automatically resulted from a
proven statutory violation because of the public interest in
assuring that the market receives adequate and timely disclo-
sure of relevant information. The majority held that no show-
ing of irreparable harm was needed in view of the fact that
Mosinee was in the best position to administer the Act, as its
prime enforcer. As a result of this decision, irreparable harm
had been entirely supplanted as a prerequisite of injunctive
relief.
Rondeau petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari on two questions: (1) Did the Seventh Circuit correctly
decide that a showing of irreparable harm was not a prerequis-
ite to granting injunctive relief under section 13(d); (2) Did the
Seventh Circuit correctly decide that an unintentional viola-
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tion of section 13(d) must be neutralized to deny the violator
the benefit of his wrongdoing after the violation had been cor-
rected? The petition was granted on December 15, 1974.
The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 17, 1975.112
It decided both questions raised by Rondeau's petition for cer-
tiorari in his favor. The Court held (1) that irreparable harm
is a prerequisite to injunctive relief absent explicit statutory
language to the contrary and (2) that absent a showing of irre-
parable harm no negative sanction was needed in response to
Rondeau's technical and unintended violation of the Williams
Act. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the
judgment of the district court reinstated.
The importance of this decision lies in its meaning for the
fashioning of injunctive relief in particular and the fashioning
of relief for judicially created implied causes of action in gen-
eral. Not surprisingly for this Court, the majority declined to
broaden the traditional bases for granting injunctions. As a
historical tool of the common law, the injunction was court
molded and designed to prevent irreparable harm, that is,
immediate injury which could not later be compensated
through damages. Additionally, as the Court explicitly noted,
"the historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to
punish."" 3 And finally the injunction was to be a flexible tool
fit for nice adjustment and reconciliation between competing
claims. On all three grounds the Seventh Circuit's use of the
injunction was found wanting. That court conceded the ab-
sence of irreparable harm, but nonetheless imposed an injunc-
tion which severely penalized Rondeau for an unintentional
violation without taking into account the nature of the viola-
tion. During oral argument the Chief Justice noted that it was
within the power of Congress to create lesser or different stan-
dards for issuance of injunctions. But in the Williams Act Con-
gress had not done so. In this part of its decision the Court did
not cut back on the scope of injunctive relief; it only reiterated
112. The vote was six to three, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissenting.
Justice Marshall dissented without opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a brief dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Douglas, who did not sit for oral argument. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent emphasized his belief that Congress had meant to change the traditional
elements needed for injunctive relief under the Williams Act. Chief Justice Burger
authored the Court's Opinion, on behalf of himself and Justices Stewart, White, Black-
mun, Powell and Rehnquist.
113. 422 U.S. at 61.
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the prevailing legal understanding about the terms of its use.
In so doing the Court exercised its special duty to oversee the
maintenance of uniformity in the construction of uncodified
rules of practice throughout the federal judiciary. As we shall
see in a later part of this article, a contrary decision would have
resulted in serious confusion had federal courts been at liberty
to simultaneously set new contours on the scope of the remedies
they ordered and define new judicially created causes of action.
Secondly, this decision is important because of the words of
caution the Court addressed to federal judges dealing with
implied causes of action. The Court recognized the "power of
federal courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws
violations when to do so is consistent with the legislative
scheme and necessary for the protection of investors as a sup-
plement to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.""' 4 But the relief obtainable through such a cause of
action would have to be chosen from the existing arsenal of
judicial weapons. In the securities field that arsenal includes
rescission, divestiture, damages, stock voting limitations, and
injunctions. What the Court has done then is to free the prac-
tising lawyer to advance new implied causes of action requiring
new variations to old remedies, while at the same time restrain-
ing the judiciary from ignoring the traditional standards which
must be met before those remedies may be granted. This com-
bination of freedom and restraint found its way into the
Rondeau decision. "The power to make the right of recovery
[under the securities laws] effective implies the power to uti-
lize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the
litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case."
[emphasis added]."5 In other words, if the Court was willing
to change the concepts upon which litigation might go forward
it was unwilling to completely change the rules by permitting
novel remedies to result from novel claims. Such judicial re-
straint no doubt reflects proper concern about the vague, but
114. 422 U.S. at 62. But this recognition was limited by the Court's language in
S.I.P.C. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 418 (1975), citing Passenger Corp. v. Passenger
Assn., 414 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1974):
It goes without saying . . . that the inference of such a private cause of action
not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident
legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes to be
served by the Act.
115. 422 U.S. at 62.
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nonetheless real, line of demarcation between the primary roles
and responsibilities of the judicial as contrasted to the legisla-
tive branch of government. It also reflects justifiable concern
that litigation not be a voyage on entirely uncharted waters.
One parameter should remain fixed as a guide buoy which is
familiar to the legal profession and against which changes can
be measured for effect. By contrast the Seventh Circuit in its
decision had created a new remedy to complement an implied
right of action for a statute that by its terms spoke to neither
litigation nor relief. The Court's ruling on the Williams Act in
the Rondeau case fits squarely within the foregoing analytical
framework. Mosinee brought its lawsuit under the Williams
Act on a judicially created implied cause of action. The Sev-
enth Circuit granted relief by designing a new remedy founded
on injunction without irreparable harm. As matters stood be-
fore appeal, Mosinee had won novel extraordinary relief based
on a notice statute that by its terms created no right of action.
In reversing, the Supreme Court preserved the traditional ele-
ments for injunctive relief and followed its practice of judicial
restraint by requiring implied actions to satisfy those tradi-
tional elements by consideration of the same factors that would
govern relief in similar actions familiar to the federal judiciary.
As another indication of its judicial restraint the Court lim-
ited its decision to the narrowest possible grounds. The Court
did not decide whether or under what circumstances a corpora-
tion could obtain a decree enjoining a shareholder who is cur-
rently in violation of the Williams Act from acquiring further
shares, exercising voting rights, or launching a takeover bid,
pending compliance with the reporting requirements of the
Act. This important question has thus been left to the lower
courts to continue to resolve on a case by case basis. A review
of Williams Act cases to date shows that the lower courts have
generally insisted that violations be cured but have imposed no
further permanent or punitive remedies, absent proof of inten-
tional violation.
If the Rondeau decision heralds any trends at all, they are
simply that the Supreme Court will be very wary of getting too
far ahead of Congress in imposing remedies on implied causes
of action, and that the Court will be very careful to fix parame-
ters within which litigants contest their claims. These are mod-
est trends because they represent nothing new in the approach
the Court takes to its work. But they are powerful trends be-
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cause they represent an ongoing concern by the Court about the
relationship of its work to the work of the Congress, and an
ongoing respect for orderly, measured change when the need for
change arises."'
116. Two Williams Act cases since Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co. support the view
taken by this article that the Rondeau decision may reverse the trend toward replacing
the requirement of irreparable harm for an injunction with a balancing the equities
test. In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,404 (1976), the Ninth
Circuit rejected the balancing-the-equities test altogether, holding that preliminary
injunctions against voting had been improperly issued by the lower court because the
offeror-plaintiff could not establish irreparable harm from the alleged section 14(a) and
14(e) violations.
In issuing each of its injunctions, the court concluded that money damages
would not afford Klaus adequate relief for the harm caused him by manage-
ment's violation of the law. It found that a balancing of the equities in each
instance indicated that management should not be permitted to vote the shares
in question pending a final judgment. We find that the court applied an im-
proper test for the availability of injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court has recently restricted the availability of injunctive
relief to either of the parties contesting a take-over bid for an alleged violation
of the federal securities laws. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., - U.S. -
(1975). . . . [It held] that a showing of irreparable harm remained essential
for injunctive relief; furthermore, the harm must be threatened not to the imme-
diate contestant in the takeover bid, but to those parties whom Congress in-
tended the Act to protect-the investors to whom the tender offer was made.
The Court found that any possible harm which Rondeau's violation of section
13(d) caused the investing public was either too remote to warrant injunctive
relief or could be adequately redressed by money damages.
Klaus, supra at 95,404.
The authority of this decision, however, is diminished by the court's further state-
ment that the [Supreme] Court decided in Rondeau that the Williams Act was
designed to protect cash tender offerees, not offerors. Klaus, supra at 99,068. This is
clearly a misinterpretation of the Rondeau decision as the court stressed the extreme
care which was taken by the Act's draftsmen "to avoid tipping the balance of regula-
tion either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."
422 U.S. at 58-59.
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil and Gas Co. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,424
(1976), a Texas district court did not reject the balancing the equities test, but down-
played its importance, saying:
A second principle found in the litany of standards for review of an applica-
tion for preliminary injunction is that the plaintiff must prove that denial of the
requested relief would result in irreparable injury. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 2069 (1975); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also, Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490,
493 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
supra. Finally, the courts have added as a measure, the "balancing of equities."
This is probably no more than another means of expressing an ultimate conclu-
sion that, all things considered, the final determined relief is proper.
There is a great overlap among these standards partly concealed by their
seriatim listing. And with irreparable injury the overlap may be almost com-
plete at least as to the "adequacy of the remedy at law" (complete enough to
avoid a separate listing). . ..
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This case involved alleged violations of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. On the other hand, the Southern District
of New York has ignored the Rondeau ruling and continued to endorse the balancing-
the equities test. See The Anaconda Company v. Crane Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,364 (1976), Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,342 (1976). These cases may no longer be precedent for the balancing-the-equities
test, however, because on appeal from the Western District of New York, the Second
Circuit has since cited Rondeau with approval. Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Self,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,427 (1976). Although the court held that the district court
had based its injunction for violation of section 13(d) on a likelihood of irreparable
harm, it advised the court to determine whether the plaintiff was still being harmed.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,178 (1976).
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